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Three methods for generating and distributing shared group
encryption keys in a cryptographic system are described. All
three methods can be used. to implement secure broadcasts among
groups of users in computer networkS h One method uses n personal
keys to construct a master key for 2 -1 keys.
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l~ Introduction
Distributed computing systems are collections of sites con-
nected by a communications network. Each site comprises process-
ing and memory resources. A user at one site may transmit a mes-
sage to a user at another site, or a user may broadcast one mes-
sage to several users at different sites.
Information can be protected within a site by standard
mechanisms [DENN791. Information can be protected while in tran-
slt through the network by a cryptosystem and associated key dis-
tribution scheme [DIFF76, NEED?8, RlVE78]. This paper extends
previous work about secure communication between pairs of users
to secure communication among groups of users. We show how a
group of users may securely broadcast and share confidential in-
formation in the network. Our methods are not limited to network
communication, they apply equally to groups formed within a sin-
gle site.
Consider a cryptosystem for N users distributed among one or
more sites in a computer network where keys are arbitrary bit se-
quences of length b. Each user A has a secret personal key KA•
A group G is any non-empty subset of the N users. Members of G
\
share a secret group key KG' which allows them to broadcast and
receive messages from other members of G, and to access and up-




A given user may be a member of as many as 2 groups. (By
,
default each user A is a member of a group of size one with group
key KAo) There can be at most 2N_l nonempty groups in the system.
We shall explore three 'methods to generate and distribute
group keys. Each assumes the existence of one or more Authent i -
cation Servers (AS) [NEED781. All aspects of key distribution
for any given group will be managed within a single AS. An AS
can be regarded as a manager of the group(s) it serves. The
three schemes are evaluated with respect to these criteria:
1. The amount of storage required for keys to support all
2N_l groups.
2. The ability of the scheme to support a hierarchical
structure, where each group G may have a manager MG
that is permitted access to all group keys for all sub-
sets of G.
The first criterion is important, since the number of possible
groups grows exponentially with the number N of users. Ideally,
the storage required for keys should be bounded by a polynomial
in N of small degree. The second criterion is important in sys-
terns that require hierarchically structured gr?ups. Sections 2-4
describe each of the three methods respectively, giving their
storage requirements for keys. Section 5 discusses the ability
of the methods to support a hierarchical structure.
In the first two methods described, it is assumed that each
user's personal key is registered with some ~S. In the first
4
method, each group G registers wi.th some AS, which then generates
,
a random key KG that it stores locally on behalf of the group.
Each member A of G then independently acquires KG from the AS.
The AS protects KG while it is in transit to A by enciphering it
under A's personal secret key RAe A variant ·of this approach
permits a group leader to acquire KG and distribute it to the
members of G. In the second method, the AS derives each group
key from the personal keys of the group members.
the nece~sity for the AS to keep a list of all group
Th 1s removes
keys. The
third method uses a public key distribution method [DIFF76]. In
this case, the AS does not need to know the users' personal keys,
although it must keep a list of group keys.
2. Stored Random Group Keys
In this scheme, an Authentication Se~ver keeps a list of all
group keys for the groups it manages (inpluding the personal keys
for all users in these groups). In order to establish -a group G,
a member A of G registers G with AS. The AS returns to A a group
identifier I
G
, which A distributes to the members of G. The AS
also generates a group key,' KG' and creates a record identified
by I
G
that lists KG and the members of G. '..
The key distribution protocols are as follo,w9. Let EIM,KI
denote message M enciphered under key K. When a member A of G
wishes to acquire KG' the following steps are taken.




AS fetches the group record identified by IG, verifies that A is
a member of the group, and returns KG to A, enciphered under A's
secret key:
where T 16 a time-stamp used to protect against replay of prevl-
cus keys (iet case group keys should change) [SACC791. Because
the group key KG Is enciphered under A'S personal secret key, it
is not possible for an intruder to either intercept KG or to im-
personate A and acquire a group key for a group to which he does
not belong.
The primary disadvantage of this approach is the storage re-
quirements for group keys. An AS may have to store up to 2
N
_l
group keys. If each user stores his own group keys, the total
N-1
storage requirements for keys are even worse, namely N * 2 •
Clearly the potential storage requirements make this scheme im-
practical for- systems with many groups. Although all possible
groups are not likely to exist in practice, a method whose worst
case storage is less than exponential is preferable.
"
Needham and Schroeder have proposed protocols for distrlbut-
ing a secret communication key K to any two users. This protocol
does not require the AS to store up to (~) of the possible keys
for all possible groups (NEED78, SACC79]. Their protocol re-
quires one of the users to acquire K from AS and give it to the
"
6
others. It Is assumed that such a communication key is used only
for a single interactIon,. Clea"rlY
J
the advantage of their ap-
proach Is that neither the AS nor the users need keep a table of
communication keys.
Although Needham's and Schroeder's approach could also be
employed here, it is less attractive with larger groups, espe-
cially when it is necessary to retain group keys in order to de-
cipher infor~ation in long-term storage. A group leader A would
be responsible for obtaining a group key KG from AS and distri-
buting KG to the other members of G. Since A does not have ac-
cess to the personal secret keys of the members of the group, the
AS must provide A with enciphered messages for all members of G:
which A then distributes. If there are n members in G, then A
must send n enciphered messages. If KG Is to be used on a long-,
term basis, then either A must store the n messages, redistribut-
ing them to the other members of G on request,· or else each
member of G must store KG in a table. In both cases, the storage
requirements are even worse than If the AS stores all of the keys
and distributes them directly.
There is also another problem. The time stamp T inserted by
the AS may not be valid long enough for the group leader A to
distribute KG to all members of G on a long-term basis. This
problem is solved with a public key distribution method {DIFF761.
To send KG tQ a member 5, A would encipher KG and a current time
7
stamp under B's public key. Although this reduces the storage
requirements for A, the worst case storage·requirements for all
group keys is still 2N_l.
3. polynomial Deriv~d Group Keys
For this scheme, we assume that each user A has three per-
sonal secret keys, K
A
, KXA, and KYA, and that these keys are all
registered with the AS. We shall show how all group keys can be
derived from the personal keys KX and KY of the users. Thus, the
2N_l group keys are generable from a table of only 2N elements.
The method Is based on Shamir's threshold scheme for con-





) be the personal keys for the users of
some group G of size n. Construct the unique polynomial PG of
degree n-l through the n points In the 2-dlmensional plane:
(KXI,KY
I
), ••• , (KXn,KYn). The group key KG Is the value of the
polynomlal at 0; that Is,
l\rlthmetic Is done modulo a prlme number p, where l09 2 (P) is not
greater than the key length b. The x-coordinates KX for all
users are distinct but randomly drawn from the range [l ••. p-l].
Thus, each group has a different polynomial, and it should not be
possible for one group to guess either the polynomial or the key
for another g,roup.
B
A user A requests a group key KG from AS by supplying a list
of the members of the group:
A -> AS: ... , u .)n
If A belongs to the group (I.e., A'" Ui for some i
, 1 ~ 1 < n),
AS constructs KG and returns it to A, enciphered under Ais per-
sonal key KA:
Note that any subset of n-l of the members of a group G of
size n can reconstruct the polynomial PG since the key
h
th.
t em an n polnt. However, this does not mean that n-l
KG gives
of the
members can form a coalition to determine the personal keys of
the nth user, because his x-coordinate is secret. This Is espe-
cially important for groups of size two, if the x-coordinates
were not secret (e.g., t.hey were the u~ers' identiflers), two
users could determine each others' secret keys from their own
keys and their common group key. In Shamir's application, it is
unnecessary for the x-coordinates to be secret, because the indi-
vidual users are not given the polynomial derived key.
"The disadvantage of this approach (or any approach which
derives group keys from users' personal keys) i5 that group keys
must be changed whenever users' personal keys are changed (or
else previous group keys must be retained).
9
4. public!!l Distribution
The third approach is based on Diffie's and Hellman's public
key distribution method (DIFF76]_ Unlike the other two ap-
proaches, the AS Is not given access to users' personal keys.
Instead, each user A registers with the AS a public key
XA2 mod p,
where p is prime number fixed by AS such that l09 2 (P) ~ b, and XA
is known only to A. Note that XA is not A's personal encryption
key, although it must be given the same level of protection.
Since no fast algorithm is known for evaluating the discrete 10g-
arlthm function, X
A
cannot be practlcally computed from
cause p is prime, A can also compute the inverse x;l
(p-ll :
The "method for constructing from XA and
p Is identical to
that described in [RIVE'S] for computing a public-key exponent e
from a secret-key exponent d.




When a member A of G requests from the AS a key KG' using the
public key Y
A
, the AS computes and returns:
X
ZA,G ~ (yA}·G mod p
XAXG'"' 2 mod p 6






Xl\XA2 mod p ... 2 mod p .. 2) •. Note that an intruder is un-
able to compute KG without computing a discrete logarithm.
In this approach, like the first, storage of up to 2
N
_l
group keys may be necessary if they must be'retalned for 10n9-
term use. Either the AS or the users must keep these group keys.
11
5. Master Keys in a Hierarchical Structure
--r -
..
Consider a tree structured hierarchy 0'£ groups. The nodes
of the tree correspond to subsystems or processes; the root of
the tree corresponds to the entire system, and the descendents of
a node to its components. These components cooperate by sharing
information, either by accessing a common database or by exchang-
log messages. Their communication can be made secure by defining
a group G that includes these component subsystems, ~nd encipher-
ing all communfcations and data files using the group key KG" In
systems of this type, it is often useful to designate some pro-
cess M
G
as the manager of all communication among and within the
components of G. such a process can oversee resource utilization
and moni tor other aspects of system operation. We will call MG
the master of group G. We desire to permit MG
access to all
group keys for groups formed from subsets of G. and no others.
This will be referred to as the master ~ problem.
The method of stored random group keys does not provide a
practical solution to the master key problem. In that scheme,
each manager wou1d require a separate key for all his subgroups.
A manager for a group of size n might have to store a list of
n2 -1 keys ..
The pUblic key distribution method suffers from the same
limitation. However, a practical solution· to the master key
problem using public key distribution methods may yet exist.
This 1s an op~n problem.
12
our second method. polynomial derived group keys, provides a
most attractive s~lution: Each master MG for a group G of size n
need only store a list of the n pairs (KX i , KY 1) for each ~ser 1
in G. This list will serve as a master key for all 2"_1 keys for
the subgroups of G.
6. Summary
Three methods for generating and distributing group encryp-
tion keys in a cryptographic system have been described. In the
first method, qroup keys are distributed by an Authentication
Server with accesS to users' personal keys. When a group regis-
ters with the Authentication Servers, a random group key is geo-
erated. stored. and distributed to the members of the group on
request. In the second method, group keys are also distributed
by an Authentication Server, but each group key is derived from
The masterallows a simple solution to the master key problem.
the personal keys of the members






for a group of size n can generate all 2n_1 ~eys for its sub-
groups using as master key the n personal keys of the'members in
his group. The third method employs public key distribution. In,
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